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United States v. Robinson
275 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2001)
L Facs
Joseph Brooks Robinson ("Robinson") and StanleyLeon Obanion,Jr. were
convicted of conspiracy to commit car-jackings, using and carrying a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence, causing death by the use of a
firearm during a crime of violence, three counts of car-jacking, one count of
attempted car-jacking, and four counts of carrying a firearm during a crime of
violence. The crimes occurred between December 29, 1997 and January2, 1998.
The appellants were both sentenced to life imprisonment. The two defendants
appealed on several issues including: improper venue, illegal searches, and abuse
of discretion in admitting testimony of one of the witnesses. Additionally,
Robinson claimed that he was deprived of his statutory right to the assistance of
two attomeys.1
I. Hdding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
ruling of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.2 The
Fourth Circuit held that venue was proper in the District of Maryland, all
searches were sufficientlytied to the carjacking and racketeering crimes, and the
witness's testimony was not hearsay.' Notably, the Fourth Circuit declined to
exercise its discretion to correct the plain error that occurred when the district
court failed to provide defendants with their statutoryright to two attorneys after
they had been charged with capital crimes.4
Iii. A mvii, Applix Va
The issue analyzed in this note is the refusal of the Fourth Circuit to notice
the plain error made by the District Count in failing to appoint two attomeys
when the defendants had been charged with a death-eligible crime. In Unitai
State v Boom,' a panel of the Fourth Circuit held that a defendant charged with
a death-eligible crime is entitled, under 18 U.S.C S 3005, to representation bytwo
1. United States v. Robinson, 275 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Qr. 2001).
2. Id
3. Id at 378-82.
4. Id at 384.
5. 245 F.3d 352 (4th Cr. 2001).
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attorneys regardless of whether the Government actuallyseeks the death penalty.6
In the case at hand, because Robinson failed to object to the appointment of only
one attorney, the standard of review used by the Fourth Circuit was the plain
error standard In order for the Court to find plain error, the defendant must
prove the following three elements: (1) there was an error, (2) the error was
plain; and (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights! However,
even if the defendant meets these three elements, it is still within the discretion
of the court to correct the error. The court need not correct the error unless the
error "seiously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." 9 The Fourth Circuit concluded that Robinson did satisfythe three
elements of plain error."
Robinson was initiallyprovided with two attorneys during pretrial proceed-
ings, but upon the Government's decision not to seek the death penalty, one of
the attorneys was excluded from his duties.1 Under Bocwe, failure to provide a
death- eligible defendant with two attorneys, even when the Government declines
to seek death, is plain error.2 This error is not reviewable for harmlessness so
it necessarily affected Robinson's substantial rights." In the instant case, the
Fourth Circuit held that Robinson had in fact met all the elements for plain
error."4 However, the Court, in its discretion, refused to take notice of the plain
error stating that the error "did not affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputa-
tion of judicial proceedings." 5
In order to avoid being subject to the discretion of the court it is necessary
for a defendant to object when the court fails to appoint the statutorily required
two attorneys for a death-eligible crime. Had Robinson objected in this case, his
conviction would have been vacated as Boone's conviction was vacated. A
defense attomeyalways should remember to object when a defendant is charged
with a death-eligible crime and the court fails to appoint two attorneys. This
objection is similar to the long list of objections that defense attorneys must
make in order to avoid procedural default. While failing to object when two
attorneys are not assigned does not leave the defendant without options in the
way that failing to object to avoid procedural default does, it does place the
6. United States v. Boone, 245 F.3d 352, 358 (4th Cr. 2001); see 18 U.S.C S 3005 (2000)
(mandating that a defendant charged with a capital crime is entitled to representation by two
attorneys regardless of whether the Government actually seeks the death penalty).
7. Rabinsn, 275 F.3d at 383.
8. Id at 383 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
9. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993).
10. RcJbnima 275 F.3d at 384.
11. Id
12. B=Am, 245 F.3d at 360-61.
13. United States v. David, 83 F.3d 638, 647 (4th Cr. 1996) (holding that an error that does
not affect substantial rights is harmless error).
14. Robiom, 275 F.3d at 384.
15. Id
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defendant within the discretion of the court, which is essentially the equivalent.
However, if the defendant objects at trial, the court is forced to vacate a
subsequent conviction for failure to appoint two attorneys when the defendant
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